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1INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
Amici Curiae are academics in law, medicine, health 
policy and clinical genetics. Collectively, they have advised 
governments in the United States, Canada, South Africa, 
the United Kingdom and Australia, as well as international 
organizations including the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the European Union 
and the World Health Organization on human gene patents 
and life science innovation. Speci cally, they chaired a task 
force of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, 
Health and Society on human gene patents, testi ed 
before Congress on genetic testing, drafted guidelines 
for the OECD on the licensing of genetic inventions, 
prepared a report for the OECD on intellectual property 
management in the life sciences, prepared Opinions for 
the European Commission on intellectual property issues 
in life sciences, drafted reports for the U.S. Congress, 
prepared multiple case studies on gene patenting in the 
United States and prepared submissions for Australian 
law reform inquiries into gene patenting.
Dr. E. Richard Gold, LLB, S.J.D., is a James McGill 
Professor at the Faculty of Law of McGill University. He 
1. The petitioners have  led a letter of blanket consent to 
 ling amicus briefs and this letter is lodged with the Clerk. The 
respondents granted consent to amici on January 9, 2013 via 
electronic mail. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, the amici 
submitting this brief and their counsel hereby represent that no 
party to this case nor their counsel authored this brief in whole 
or in part, and that no person other than amici, using research 
funds provided by Value Addition through Genomics and GE3LS 
(VALGEN), paid for or made a monetary contribution toward the 
preparation and submission of this brief.
2has authored an extensive case study of Myriad Genetics 
and its patenting policies and was the Expert Consultant 
who drafted the OECD Guidelines on the Licensing of 
Genetic Inventions. He practiced law in the areas of 
intellectual property licensing and  nancing of small to 
medium-sized technology companies and has provided 
judicial education in the United States, Canada and 
France on questions of intellectual property, property 
and the life sciences. He also heads intellectual property 
and technology transfer research within the Value 
Addition through Genomics and GE3LS (VALGEN), a 
publicly  nanced research project on agriculture and crop 
biotechnology and is co-lead of intellectual property within 
a Genome Canada funded project on commercialization 
and personalized medicine.
Dr. Tania Bubela, Ph.D., J.D., is Associate Professor 
of Health and Intellectual Property Law at the School of 
Public Health of the University of Alberta. She has written 
and consulted extensively on the commercialization of 
genomics r esearch and the process of technology transfer. 
She has active research grants in the  elds of mouse 
models for human disease, synthetic biology and DNA 
barcoding. She leads a publicly-funded research project on 
legal, economic and institutional barriers to translational 
stem cell research and co-leads a Genome Canada funded 
project on commercialization and personalized medicine.
Dr. Robert Cook-Deegan, M.D., is Research Professor 
in the Institute for Genome Sciences & Policy and Sanford 
School of Public Policy at Duke University. He is also 
a Research Professor of Medicine and of Biology. He 
helped co-found the DNA Patent Database at Georgetown 
University, and was the principal investigator for a series 
3of case studies on the impact of patenting and licensing 
on clinical access to genetic testing that were prepared 
for the Secretary’s Advisory Committee for Genetics, 
Health and Society.
Dr. James P. Evans, M.D., Ph.D., is Bryson 
Distinguished Professor of Genetics and Medicine at the 
School of Medicine of the University of North Carolina. 
He is a board certi ed Medical Geneticist and Internist 
with extensive clinical and research expertise in the area 
of genetics and genetic testing, including the analysis of 
the BRCA1/2 genes in both research and clinical settings. 
He chaired the Task Force that laid the groundwork for 
GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTING: REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH, 
AND SOCIETY (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, April 2010). He is also the editor-in-chief of 
GENETICS IN MEDICINE, the journal of the American College 
of Medical Genetics.
Dr. Julian Kinderlerer is Professor of Intellectual 
Property Law at the University of Cape Town, South 
Africa, Professor of Biotechnology and Society at the 
Technical University, Delft, The Netherlands and a Former 
Director of the Shef eld Institute of Biotechnological 
Law and Ethics in the United Kingdom. He heads the 
Research Unit on Intellectual Property Law and Policy 
at the University of Cape Town. He is also President 
of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies that advises the European Commission, 
Council and Parliament on ethical issues. He has written 
extensively on patent issues in relation to the life sciences 
for the European Commission and has served on several 
4UK advisory bodies in relation to the use of genetically 
modi ed organisms.
Dr. Dianne Nicol, Ph.D., L.L.M., is a Professor of 
Law in the Faculty of Law at the University of Tasmania, 
Australia and Deputy Director of the Centre for Law and 
Genetics, based at the University of Tasmania. She has 
conducted research and written extensively on intellectual 
property in biotechnology and commercialization of 
biomedical research.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, the patent-eligibility 
of which is contested in this case, are sequences of DNA 
that specify the production of protein molecules involved 
in detecting and repairing DNA damage. All human genes 
are made of molecules of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
that are transcribed into ribonucleic acid (RNA). DNA is 
the chemical storage and transmission medium of genetic 
information. It stores information within cells and it 
transmits genetic information from cell to cell, organism to 
organism, and generation to generation. RNA is a molecule 
that is essential in the translation of genetic information 
into proteins and possesses several regulatory functions 
within cells. The impugned composition-of-matter claims 
in this case thus constitute human genes as they claim the 
concrete embodiments of those genes.
This Court has recognized that 35 U.S.C. § 101 
contains a single exception to patentable subject matter 
that comprises three components: laws of nature, 
abstract ideas and phenomena of nature. While Mayo v. 
Prometheus, 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012) is this Court’s latest 
5statement on the purpose and nature of this exception, it 
builds on a century and a half of consistent jurisprudence. 
According to Mayo, this exception is crucial to achieving 
the overarching aim of patent law to facilitate rather than 
inhibit innovation.
Mayo builds on Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 
(1980), which distinguished between claims to naturally 
occurring compounds and claims to inventions. According 
to Chakrabarty, to constitute an invention constituting 
patentable subject matter, the claimed compound must 
possess a ‘markedly different’ function than does the 
natural compound.
DNA inherently possesses a dual nature that 
has a decisive impact in determining whether the 
claimed inventions are ‘markedly different’ from their 
natural counterparts. First, DNA is the embodiment 
of information in the order of its base pairs, forming a 
quaternary code analogous to the binary code used in 
computer software. Second, it is a physical chemical with 
bonds, folding and other physical characteristics that 
determine its biochemical properties. The reduction of 
DNA to either a chemical or to pure information—and 
thus ignoring its dual nature—has led courts below, the 
parties and commentators to misapply the ‘markedly 
different’ test.
Because one of the natural functions of DNA and 
RNA is to store and transmit information, a ‘markedly 
different’ function must be something beyond these. 
Yet, the speci cation does not recite any such function 
in relation to many of the molecules falling within the 
impugned claims.
6Further, the impugned claims attempt to capture the 
genetic information embodied within human genes. In 
fact, the speci cation speci cally recites the use of the 
invention to retrieve this information. Information does 
not, however, constitute patentable subject matter under 
precedents of both this Court and of the Federal Circuit.
This Court held in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 
(1981) that the addition of insignificant post-solution 
activity does not convert a claim over unpatentable subject 
matter into one that was eligible for patent protection. 
Isolating a human gene is an example of such insigni cant 
post-solution activity. Moreover, in the context of 
diagnostics, isolation is merely a byproduct of the real 
purpose, which is to exactly copy the information stored 
in a person’s DNA. While the step of isolation may require 
technical skill, the legal test of signi cance of the activity 
is based on whether the activity itself gives a markedly 
different function to the invention. When the purpose 
of creating a DNA molecule is to reveal the genetic 
information it embodies—as is the case when conducting 
diagnostic tests or in doing science to study the BRCA1/2 
genes—isolation does not provide any additional function 
to a gene beyond its natural information storage function. 
Therefore, making an exact copy and ‘isolating’ the DNA 
is not suf cient in itself to convert the copied DNA into a 
patentable invention. In addition, claims over human genes 
that possess no function beyond their ability to store the 
natural genetic information recorded on human genes 
cannot be patented.
In constrast, both natural and altered DNA and RNA 
that possess functions beyond information storage and 
transmission are eligible for patent protection. To claim 
7naturally-occurring isolated sequences, patent claims 
would need to be restricted to the use of the molecule 
for the additional function. For altered DNA and RNA 
molecules, the invention can normally be protected using 
composition-of-matter claims, provided they also satisfy 
§§ 102, 103, and 112 as well as § 101 utility.
ARGUMENT
The question before this Court—are human genes 
patentable?—asks whether and under which circumstances 
the molecular unit of human heredity, in the form of strands 
of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and/or ribonucleic acid 
(RNA) (see Helen Pearson, Genetics: What is a Gene?, 441 
NATURE 398 (2006)), constitute patentable subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. DNA strands may contain the 
sequence of entire human genes without any deletions or 
editorial changes (genomic DNA or gDNA), sequences of 
messenger RNA that correspond (through transcription) 
to that gDNA, sequences of DNA that (through reverse 
transcription) correspond to the messenger RNA that is 
translated into proteins by cellular ribosomal complexes 
(complementary DNA or cDNA), and smaller strands of 
either DNA or RNA. 
In the context of the present case, nine patent claims 
fall within the above understanding of human genes: 
claims 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 of the 5,747,282 patent (’282 patent), 
claims 1, 6 and 7 of the 5,837,492 patent (’492 patent) and 
claim 1 of the 5,693,473 patent (’473 patent). These claims 
read, collectively, over gDNA sequences, cDNA sequences 
and RNA sequences, ranging in length from 15 base pairs 
to the entire, unedited, gene sequence for BRCA1 and 
BRCA2.
8While the context in which this case is set—health 
care innovation—demonstrates the social and ethical 
importance of the question before the Court, its answer 
can be determined solely on the basis of this Court’s 
precedents on patent eligibility that stretch back well over 
a century. The latest of these, Mayo v. Prometheus, 132 
S.Ct. 1289 (2012), is simply the most recent in a long and 
consistent line of jurisprudence.
The Effect of Broad Claims over Human Genes on 
Innovation
While perhaps more socially and politically charged 
than most patent law issues (See, e.g., E. Richard Gold 
& Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the 
Policy Storm, 12 (4) GENETICS MED. S39 (2010) (April 
supplement)), legal controversies over the patenting of 
human genes can be resolved through the application of 
this Court’s precedents. Peter Yun-Hyoung Lee, Inverting 
the Logic of Scienti c Discovery: Applying Common Law 
Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain Patents 
on Biotechnology Research Tools, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
79, 82 (2005).
Nowhere is the impact of broad claims over human 
genes more evident than in the  eld of human genetic 
testing. In a study of US and European patents affecting 
such testing, researchers found that, out of the 22 inherited 
diseases studied, 16 diseases are subject to at least one 
blocking patent. Isabelle Huys, et al., Legal Uncertainty 
in the Area of Genetic Diagnostic Testing, 27 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 903, 904 (2009). 
Recent advances in DNA sequencing have led to a 
dramatic increase in the ef ciency and scope of genetic 
9testing. Yet the grant of patents over human genes has 
impeded innovation in this domain. This problem has 
emerged in developing a new and more comprehensive 
approach to test those at risk of breast and ovarian 
cancer. ‘Deep sequencing’ tests of over twenty genes are 
comparable in cost to the two-gene BRCA1/2 sequence-
based test offered by the Respondents. Tom Walsh et 
al., Detection of Inherited Mutations for Breast and 
Ovarian Cancer Using Genomic Capture and Massively 
Parallel Sequencing, 107 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES 12629, 12631 
(2010). Commercial laboratories have begun to offer 
comprehensive genetic testing in a single test of almost 
all genes—that notably leaves out BRCA1/2, the human 
genes subject to the claims in question—that may explain 
inherited risk of breast or ovarian cancer.
For example, Ambry Genetics, a commercial 
diagnostic genetics laboratory, recently began offering 
sequencing of a panel of cancer genes. AMBRY GENETICS 
http://www.ambrygen.com/tests/breastnext (last visited 
December 13, 2012). The Ambry Genetics panel has the 
potential to be a very useful clinical test but its utility is 
severely undermined by the fact that the Ambry Genetics 
panel does not include BRCA1/2. These exclusions are 
attributable to infringement liability from the patents 
at issue in this case. The lack of coverage of BRCA1/2 
forces a clinician to order two expensive tests serially 
from two different providers when one comprehensive 
test would not only be less expensive, but provide more 
timely results to patients. As the Respondents have 
never licensed the sequence-based testing of BRCA1/2 
(although they have licensed testing for known individual 
mutations, a distinction often incompletely explained 
by Respondents) Respondents’ patents prevent the 
10
development of a comprehensive sequence-based test of 
the twenty-some known genes associated with breast and 
ovarian cancer. While cross-licensing would theoretically 
enable the development of truly comprehensive tests, the 
industry has failed to engage in this practice for more 
than a decade, preferring instead to maximize revenue 
from single genetic tests.
In developing diagnostic tests, patent incentives 
play a much smaller role than in drug discovery or 
therapeutic biological molecules: “[P]atents have not 
caused irreparable harm in genetic diagnostics, but 
neither have they proven greatly advantageous . . . One 
justi cation for gene patents is that they speed up the 
development of tests. But the patent incentive is usually 
not necessary.” Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Dangers 
of Diagnostic Monopolies, 458 NATURE 405, 405 (2009). 
Out of 10 clinical conditions studied, researchers found 
that “in no case was the exclusive licensee [with control 
over the patents] the  rst to market.” Julia Carbone et 
al., DNA Patents and Diagnosis: Not a Pretty Picture, 
28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 784, 788 (2010).
This is not to say that patents have no place in the  eld 
of genetic diagnostics. In two of ten clinical conditions 
studied (Mercator Genetics for hemochromatosis 
and Myriad Genetics for breast and ovarian cancer), 
researchers at Duke University found that patents played 
a positive role in enticing private investment to supplement 
the public investment in genetics research. Robert Cook-
Deegan et al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing 
Practices on Access to Genetic Testing for Inherited 
Susceptibility to Cancer: Comparing Breast and Ovarian 
Cancers with Colon Cancers, 12 GENETICS IN MEDICINE 
11
S15 (2010); Subhashini Chandrasekharan, et al., Impact 
of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on Access 
to Genetic Testing for Hereditary Hemochromatosis, 
12 GENETICS IN MEDICINE S155 (2010). Despite positive 
outcomes being in the minority, these two cases illustrate 
that patents can contribute to health innovation. 
The key to preserving the bene ts of patents while 
avoiding their costs is to develop a sufficiently clear 
bright-line rule, as suggested by Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 
1303, that differentiates unpatentable human genes that 
inhibit innovation from ‘markedly different’ inventions 
that facilitate it. Thus, the question is not whether the 
Respondents ought to receive a patent for their work; the 
answer to that question is likely ‘yes’. Rather, the question 
is whether the Respondents claimed too broadly so as not 
only to claim their contributions to health and science but 
also to exclusively control any study and use of the natural 
function of human genes.
A Question of Law, Not Science
This Court speci cally warned against con ating legal 
and scienti c determinations in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303 (1980) and in Mayo. In both cases, this 
Court held that its role was limited to making legal 
determinations and not the subtle parsing of scienti c 
knowledge and opinion.
In Chakrabarty, the petitioner asked the Court 
to resist granting a patent over a genetically-created 
bacterium because “[s]cientists, among them Nobel 
laureates. . . [suggest] that genetic research may pose a 
serious threat to the human race, or, at the very least, 
12
that the dangers are far too substantial to permit such 
research to proceed apace at this time.” Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. at 316. This Court held that its role was to provide a 
legal interpretation of the patent statute, not to engage in 
science: “What is more important is that we are without 
competence to entertain these arguments—either to 
brush them aside as fantasies generated by fear of the 
unknown, or to act on them.” Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 317.
Similarly, in Mayo,  this Court held that the 
determination of the scope of exceptions to patentable 
subject matter under § 101 was a legal question, not 
one that depended on a deep understanding of science: 
“Courts and judges are not institutionally well suited to 
making the kinds of judgments needed to distinguish 
among different laws of nature. And so the cases have 
endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws 
of nature, mathematical formulas and the like, which 
serves as a somewhat more easily administered proxy 
for the underlying ‘building-block’ concern.” Mayo, 132 
S.Ct. at 1303.
The Federal Circuit in the decision below con ated 
the legal question it posed—do isolated DNA molecules 
constitute patentable subject matter under § 101?—with 
the scienti c determination of how one can isolate DNA 
molecules. For example, the majority stated as follows:
As the above description indicates, isolated 
DNA is not just puri ed DNA. Puri cation 
makes pure what was the same material, but 
was combined, or contaminated, with other 
materials. Although isolated DNA is removed 
from its native cellular and chromosomal 
environment, it has also been manipulated 
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chemically so as to produce a molecule that is 
markedly different from that which exists in 
the body.
Association for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 
1303, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“AMP v USPTO”).
In this case, the claimed isolated DNA molecules 
do not exist in nature within a physical mixture 
to be purified. They have to be chemically 
cleaved from their native chemical combination 
with other genetic materials . . . . In fact, 
some forms of isolated DNA may require 
no puri cation at all, because DNAs can be 
chemically synthesized directly as isolated 
molecules.
AMP v. USPTO at 1329.
These passages reveal a troubling con ation of science 
and law (in addition to the mistake of reducing the claimed 
invention to the process through which the Federal Circuit 
speculated it may have been produced). Rather than 
determine whether the claimed invention falls within the 
legal meaning of invention under § 101, the Federal Circuit 
answered the question of whether a scientist would use 
the same processes to isolate as to purify DNA molecules. 
The result of this approach was for the Federal Circuit, 
the actor entrusted with the duty to determine the legal 
question posed by § 101, to delegate its determination of 
patent eligibility to scientists and their processes.
There are two strong prudential reasons why this 
Court in both Chakrabarty and Mayo held that it was 
inappropriate to engage in a  ne analysis of science when 
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answering the legal question of whether a purported 
invention constitutes patentable subject matter.
First, determinations of patent-eligibility do not 
change over time but become established standards in 
the law. They do not, in particular, depend on the state 
of knowledge available to the person of skill in the art, 
whether at the moment of invention, of  ling, of patent 
grant or of claim construction. As scienti c knowledge 
undergoes rapid change, it is inappropriate to link a 
determination of patent eligibility to the particular 
understanding of the science at any one moment because 
that understanding could soon be out of date.
Second, as the decision of the majority in the Federal 
Circuit illustrates, deciding questions of patent eligibility 
on the basis of the science—or the particular technical 
procedural arcana of purification or isolation—leads 
courts to engage in speculative assessments of the state 
of scienti c knowledge. Because subject matter eligibility 
is a pure question of law, the courts are not assisted by 
expert evidence in these determinations and thus must 
make their own  ndings about the science involved. This is 
precisely the confusion that the Federal Circuit introduced 
in the present case.
The major ity opinion in the Federal Circuit 
misunderstood a seminal 1960s text on chemistry to 
hold that the de ning characteristic of the DNA molecule 
is its set of covalent bonds. (“But a covalent bond is the 
de ning boundary between one molecule and another, 
and the dissent’s citation of Linus Pauling’s comment 
that covalent bonds ‘make it convenient for the chemist 
to consider [the aggregate] as an independent molecular 
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species’ underlines the point.” AMP. v. USPTO at 1329.) 
The correct citation of the text reveals, however, that the 
de ning characteristic of a molecule is a chemical bond, 
which includes “electrostatic bonds [which encompass both 
ionic and hydrogen bonds], covalent bonds and metallic 
bonds.” LINUS PAULING, THE NATURE OF THE CHEMICAL 
BOND AND THE STRUCTURE OF MOLECULES AND CRYSTALS: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN STRUCTURAL CHEMISTRY 5 
(3d ed. 1960). Thus, a covalent bond in the Pauling text is 
but one type of chemical bond that de nes a molecule. The 
result of this misreading of the Pauling text was that the 
Federal Circuit majority focused exclusively on covalent 
bonds, when electrostatic bonds play at least as critical 
a role in the function of DNA as the unique storage and 
transmission medium of biological information.
Because of this Court’s concerns over separating legal 
from scienti c questions, it held, in Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 
1305, that courts ought not to engage in too  ne an analysis 
of the science underlying the exceptions to patentability 
even if this results in different effects in different  elds 
of technology. With this caution in mind, we turn to this 
Court’s elucidation of the exception to patentable subject 
matter in § 101.
A Single Exception Residing in 35 U.S.C. § 101
This Court has many times recognized that there are 
limits to the scope of § 101. It has encapsulated these in a 
judicially-elaborated exception relating to laws of nature, 
natural phenomena and abstract ideas (e.g., Mayo; Bilski 
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175 (1981); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.; Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 
16
(1978); Rubber Tip Pencil Company v. Howard, 87 U.S. 
498 (1874); LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852); O’Reilly 
v. Morse 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853)). In particular, this 
Court in Mayo provided a clear and straightforward 
understanding of the independent role played by this 
exception. This understanding has four elements.
First, Mayo brushed aside any uncertainties 
introduced by the Federal Circuit (MySpace Inc., v. 
GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250 (2012)) over whether a 
§ 101 determination of patentable subject matter must 
take place prior to any §§ 102, 103, and 112 or § 101 utility 
analyses. (“These considerations lead us to decline the 
Government’s invitation to substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 
inquiries for the better established inquiry under § 101.” 
Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1304.) “[T]o shift the patent-eligibility 
inquiry entirely to these later sections risks creating 
signi cantly greater legal uncertainty, while assuming 
that those sections can do work that they are not equipped 
to do.” Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1304. That is, Mayo made clear 
that determination of patent-eligibility is the  rst step in 
the analysis of the validity of any patent claim. While for 
most claims this step is so evident that it can effectively 
be skipped, courts must logically determine whether 
the claim reads over a patent-eligible invention before 
determining whether that invention complies with the 
substantive criteria of novelty, utility and obviousness, 
as well as those relating to description and enablement.
Second, § 101 implicitly contains one overarching 
exception with three components—laws of nature, 
natural phenomena and abstract ideas—and not three 
distinct exceptions. (“The Court has long held that this 
provision contains an important implicit exception. 
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‘[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ 
are not patentable.” Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293, citations 
omitted, emphasis added.) The three components are 
simply different ways to address aspects of one central, 
principled exception rather than constituting three, 
narrow, watertight and independent exceptions. This is 
illustrated in Mayo by the Court’s reliance on cases falling 
into each of the three components (O’Reilly v. Morse, 
(15 How.) 62 (1854) with respect to laws of nature; Funk 
Brothers Seed Col v. Kalo Inoculant Col, 333 U.S. 127 
(1948) and Chakrabarty regarding natural phenomena; 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), Parker v. Flook, 
437 U.S. 584 (1978), and Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 
(2010) dealing with abstract ideas) to elucidate the central 
purpose underlying the exception. In fact, the Mayo 
Court held that two cases, Diehr and Flook, both of which 
relate to abstract ideas, were “most directly on point” in 
relation to the law of nature at issue in Mayo. Mayo, 132 
S.Ct. at 1298.
Third, the underlying purpose behind the exception 
is to avoid the “danger that the grant of patents that tie 
up [the] use [of laws and principles] will inhibit future 
innovation premised upon them, a danger that becomes 
acute when a patented process amounts to no more than 
an instruction to ‘apply the natural law,’ or otherwise 
forecloses more future invention than the underlying 
discovery could reasonably justify.” Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 
1301, citations omitted. The Court recognized that patent 
law must consider both the facilitative and inhibitory 
effects of patents so as to maximize innovation:
Patent protection is, after all, a two-edged 
sword. On the one hand, the promise of exclusive 
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rights provides monetary incentives that lead 
to creation, invention, and discovery. On the 
other hand, that very exclusivity can impede 
the flow of information that might permit, 
indeed spur, invention, by, for example, raising 
the price of using the patented ideas once 
created, requiring potential users to conduct 
costly and time-consuming searches of existing 
patents and pending patent applications, and 
requiring the negotiation of complex licensing 
arrangements. 
Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1305.
Fourth, the exception  ows from the policy inherent in 
the patent laws as passed by Congress, not from de nitions 
and concepts deriving from particular branches of science. 
(“[P]atent law’s general rules must govern inventive 
activity in many different  elds of human endeavor, with 
the result that the practical effects of rules that re ect a 
general effort to balance these considerations may differ 
from one  eld to another.” Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1305). That 
is, the determination of patent eligibility is, as argued 
earlier, a pure question of law and not one that ought be 
delegated to scientists or technicians.
As the question of the patent-eligibility of human 
genes has never been directly raised, the application 
of this unitary principle (with three components) to the 
claims in issue provides a straightforward means of 
answering that question.
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‘Markedly Different’ Refers to Functional Difference
Mayo made clear that there is a single, underlying, 
purpose behind the judicially recognized exception 
to patent-eligibility under § 101: that claims may not 
encompass so much intellectual territory that they 
diminish, as opposed to facilitate, the  ow of information 
that is essential to further innovation. While stated using 
contemporary language, this purpose has long been 
embedded in this Court’s decisions concerning all three 
facets of the exception. 
This Court’s elucidation of the exception in Chakrabarty 
embodies this purpose. There, this Court held that, to 
constitute patentable subject matter, the claimed invention 
must possess “markedly different characteristics from 
any found in nature”. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310. In 
contrast to the claimed invention in Funk Brothers, which 
the Chakrabarty Court stated had no “different use” 
than what was found in nature, Chakrabarty’s invention 
carried out a new and useful function. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. at 310. (“This human-made. . . bacterium is capable of 
breaking down multiple components of crude oil. Because 
of this property, which is possessed by no naturally 
occurring bacteria, [the] invention is believed to have 
signi cant value. . . .” Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305).
By focusing on the functional difference between 
the claimed invention and its natural counterpart, the 
Chakrabarty Court was able to distinguish between 
inventions that contributed to future innovation (those 
that have a markedly different function) and those that 
hindered innovation (those that tied up an important 
natural phenomenon that lay at the heart of a great swath 
of potential innovation). 
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It is through an understanding of this underlying 
purpose—as highlighted in Mayo—that it becomes 
clear that the Chakrabarty test is related to functional 
instead of simply structural differences between claimed 
inventions and their natural counterparts. While a 
structural difference will usually result in a functional 
difference, it is the functional and not the structural 
difference that meets the legal test of patent eligibility.
Applying Chakrabarty in light of Mayo, the question 
before the Court reduces to whether claims reading over 
human genes or parts of them are functionally different 
from those same genes occurring in their natural form. 
Where the function of the claimed invention is ‘markedly 
different’ from that of the natural counterpart, it is patent-
eligible; where the claimed invention carries out the same 
function as the natural counterpart, it is not.
DNA’s Dual Nature
DNA inherently has a dual nature. It is both a 
molecule and medium for storing genetic information for 
operations within a cell and transmitting that information 
from cell to cell, organism to organism, and generation 
to generation: “DNA sequences are not simply molecules; 
they are also information. Knowing the DNA sequence for 
the genome of an organism provides valuable scienti c 
information that can open the door to future discoveries.” 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, How Can You Patent Genes?, 2 
AM. J. BIOETHICS, 30 Nov. 2010, at 3, 4 (2002). Because 
of this duality, the granting of patents over DNA has 
been controversial with scientists, physicians and policy-
makers: “[T]he central problem with human DNA 
sequence patents today is that they not only provide their 
21
holders with control over the invention itself—the physical 
molecule—but also over access to the particular health 
information coded in individual genes.” E. Richard Gold, 
Gene Patents and Medical Access, 49 INTELL. PROP. F. 
20, 24 (2002).
Information is the building block of ideas and concepts. 
As such, information is understood not to constitute 
patentable subject matter:
Patent rights are not well adapted to protecting 
information, particularly information about the 
natural world. Given that independent discovery 
of such information is quite likely to happen 
without the efforts of any particular patent 
holder, excessive protection of such information 
as intellectual property may slow down 
subsequent research more than it promotes the 
original data collection.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting Genome Research Tools 
and the Law, 326 COMPTES RENDUS BIOLOGIES 1115, 1118 
(2003); see also In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 978-980 
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
An applicant cannot simply impose a new function 
on information by restricting the claim to a particular 
technological environment. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 
450 U.S. at 191 (“A mathematical formula as such is 
not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and 
this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to 
limit the use of the formula to a particular technological 
environment.”) (citations omitted).
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Similarly, an applicant cannot turn an unpatentable 
claim to information into a patentable claim simply by 
limiting the invention to a particular medium without 
also indicating the additional function that embodying 
this information on that medium accomplishes. See In re 
Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 812 (C.C.P.A. 1979). This conclusion 
is illustrated through a consideration of the ‘printed 
matter’ doctrine in King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eon 
Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
“Roughly stated, [the ‘printed matter’ doctrine] 
dictates that ‘information recorded in [a] substrate or 
medium’ is not eligible for patent protection—regardless 
of how nonobvious and useful it is—if the advance over 
the prior art resides in the ‘content of the information.’” 
Kevin E. Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed 
Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379, 1380 (2010) 
(“Semiotics 101”).
King Pharmaceuticals involved a claim to dispensing 
a known medicine while informing patients to take the 
medicine with food and another claim to dispensing that 
medicine in conjunction with a printed label that informed 
the patient to take the medicine with food. The Federal 
Circuit rejected both claims, noting that:
In an analogous context, we have held 
that ‘[w]here the printed matter is not 
functionally related to the substrate, the 
printed matter will not distinguish the invention 
from the prior art in terms of patentability.’ 
. . . In such cases, we have recognized that the 
printed matter is not independently  patentable 
. . .
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King Pharmaceuticals, 616 F.3d at 1278-79 (citations 
omitted). 
The Federal Circuit held that there was no functional 
relationship between the information provided—to take 
the medicine with food—and the medicine itself. Id. at 
1279.
While the information of taking medicine with food 
does not constitute patentable subject matter in itself, that 
information could result in a patentable invention if limited 
to an embodiment in a speci c medium or to a context in 
which doing so has a functional advantage. This was the 
case in In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381 (Fed Cir. 1983), in 
which the Federal Circuit held as patentable an invention 
consisting of a series of numbers that, when printed on 
a circular band, served the function of educating about 
number theory. While the information itself was too 
abstract to be patented, that information when recorded 
on the particular medium served a speci c function that 
neither the numbers themselves nor their being printed 
on another medium—for example, a sheet of paper—
accomplished. See Id. at 1386-87.
Despite the fact that the King Pharmaceuticals 
Court applied the ‘printed matter’ doctrine under 35 
U.S.C. § 103, the same analysis can be applied often 
more persuasively under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See, e.g., In re 
Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., 
concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part); Semiotics 101 
at 1380 n. 1 (“The Federal Circuit grounds the printed 
matter doctrine alternately in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 103, but 
there is no principled basis for the statutory distinction”).
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One of the critical rulings in King Pharmaceuticals 
was the court’s extension of the printed matter’ doctrine 
to a large range of media: 
Although these ‘printed matter’ cases 
involved the addition of printed matter, such 
as written instructions, to a known product, 
we see no principled reason for limiting their 
reasoning to that speci c factual context.
King Pharmaceuticals, 616 F.3d at 1279. 
While information cannot be claimed as information, 
even when embodied in a medium, it is nonetheless clear 
that when the restriction of the information to a particular 
medium serves some function beyond imposing a physical 
limit on the claim, then the claim recites patentable subject 
matter: 
More than mere abstraction, the data structures 
are speci c electrical or magnetic  structural 
elements in a memory. According to Lowry, 
the data structures provide tangible bene ts: 
data stored in accordance with the claimed data 
structures are more easily accessed, stored, and 
erased. . . . In short, Lowry’s data structures 
are physical entities that provide increased 
ef ciency in computer operation.
In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583-1584 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
When the invention involves information that is 
necessarily tied to the medium on which information 
is stored, as were the data structures in In re Lowry, 
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then the invention constitutes patentable subject matter 
under § 101. On the other hand, where the embodiment of 
information on a particular medium implies no particular 
function beyond holding the information it contains, then 
that limitation cannot save the claim from invalidity under 
§ 101.
The case law thus treats the two aspects of human 
genes differently. To the extent that a claim reads over 
DNA or RNA that carries out the information storage 
and transmission function of a human gene, it does 
not constitute patentable subject matter. On the other 
hand, claims relating to DNA and RNA would satisfy 
the patentable subject matter test when the patent is 
directed to a biochemical function attached to the form of 
molecule claimed (e.g., gDNA, RNA or cDNA) that goes 
beyond simple storage and transmission of the information 
encoded in the gene. For example, DNA (even if identical 
to a natural sequence) within a construct for gene therapy, 
inserted into a bacterium or other organism to produce 
a given protein, modi ed to have new characteristics, 
forming a replicon, tagged as a probe, or DNA injected into 
the body to encode proteins that elicit a vaccine response, 
would all have this additional function. 
Isolation Constitutes Insignificant Post-solution 
Activity
Diehr further developed this Court’s elaboration on 
the underlying purpose of the § 101 exception, particularly 
in relation to its discussion of Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 
(1978). In Flook, the patent applicant claimed “a formula 
for computing an updated alarm limit,” Flook, 437 U.S. 
at 586, to help an operator identify when to terminate a 
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chemical reaction. The Diehr Court explained that, while 
the applicant had argued that the calculation of the alarm 
limit was a critical component of the underlying chemical 
reaction, in reality, the alarm limit constituted nothing 
more than insigni cant post-solution activity. Diehr, 450 
U.S. at 191. 
The Court’s discussion of function and post-solution 
activity further reveals the workings of the § 101 exception:
Similarly, insigni cant post-solution activity 
will not transform an unpatentable principle 
into a patentable process. To hold otherwise 
would allow a competent draftsman to evade 
the recognized limitations on the type of 
subject matter eligible for patent protection. 
On the other hand, when a claim containing a 
mathematical formula implements or applies 
that formula in a structure or process which, 
when considered as a whole, is performing a 
function which the patent laws were designed 
to protect (e. g., transforming or reducing an 
article to a different  state or thing), then the 
claim satis es the requirements of § 101.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-192 (citations omitted; emphasis 
added).
It is thus not just any human intervention that 
converts a natural law, an abstract idea or (as in the 
present case) a phenomenon of nature into patentable 
subject matter: that human intervention must also result 
in a markedly different function. As Chakrabarty made 
clear, that function must be other than the function of 
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the phenomenon of nature; that is, in this case, it must 
be something other than the storage and transmission of 
genetic information.
The Federal Circuit placed much emphasis on the 
fact that the impugned claims were restricted to ‘isolated’ 
molecules:
Accordingly, BRCA1 and BRCA2 in their 
isolated states are different molecules from 
DNA that exists in the body; isolated DNA 
results from human intervention to cleave 
or synthesize a discrete portion of a native 
chromosomal DNA, imparting on that isolated 
DNA a distinctive chemical identity as compared 
to native DNA.
AMP v. USPTO at 1328.
The majority in the Federal Circuit arrived at this 
conclusion not on the basis of applying the legal test of 
patentable subject matter as elucidated by this Court in 
Mayo, Chakrabarty and Flook but on the basis of its own, 
disputable, scienti c inquiry into the process of isolating 
and synthesizing human genes. In ignoring the required 
inquiry into whether the step of isolation gives rise to a 
‘markedly different’ function (Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 
310) or a “function which the patent laws are designed 
to protect” (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192), the Federal Circuit 
effectively substituted a ‘chemical structural difference 
test’ for the legal one. In doing so, it not only introduced 
a legal error but as noted earlier, in misunderstanding 
the scienti c texts from which it quoted, scienti c error 
as well.
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To determine whether isolation of a human gene by 
itself introduces a markedly different function as required 
by Chakrabarty and Diehr, one must return to the natural 
function of those genes: to store and transmit information. 
Since isolation does nothing to alter or improve this 
function, the answer, following this Court’s precedents, 
is clear: no. 
The answer would be different if, in addition to 
isolation, a new function were introduced. DNA molecules 
used to treat a disease by gene transfer or to make a 
therapeutic protein would not be merely isolated but have 
an additional, patent-eligible, function. Here, however, 
the ‘isolated’ molecule, like the original, has no function 
beyond the storage and transmission of information.
In fact, the only function suggested in the speci cation 
of the ’282 patent for an isolated, unaltered and unedited 
molecule of gDNA (as included within Claim 1 of that 
patent) is to extract the information stored on it. 
’282 Patent, col. 12, ll. 42-44 (“The  nding of BRCA1 
mutations thus provides both diagnostic and prognostic 
information”) (emphasis added); Id. at col. 28, ll. 26-28 
(“Results of these tests and interpretive information are 
returned to the health care provider for communication 
to the tested individual”) (emphasis added).
Beyond the fact that the specification does not 
suggest any function above the natural one of storing 
and transmitting information, any attempt to ‘improve’ 
the molecule by altering its sequence would make it 
useless for diagnostic purposes because it would no longer 
accurately convey the genetic information contained 
within the tested person’s cells. Indeed, the only value to 
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the isolated molecule is that the sequence of base pairs 
exactly corresponds to that of the human gene in a speci c 
person’s cells. Modifying the molecule in any way destroys 
this correspondence and renders the molecule useless for 
diagnostic purposes. A purported ‘invention’ that cannot, 
even theoretically, improve on the underlying natural 
phenomenon can hardly be considered an invention.
While claiming an ‘isolated’ gDNA molecule implies 
there has been some type of human intervention, that 
intervention does not give rise to a ‘markedly different’ 
function as required by Chakrabarty. Rather, the 
intervention constitutes the type of insigni cant post-
solution activity so criticized in Diehr. The claim is, in 
substance, a claim to the information contained in the 
human gene masquerading as a composition-of-matter 
claim. Since a claim to information cannot be saved by 
limiting it to a particular storage medium, the addition 
of the requirement of isolation adds “insigni cant post-
solution activity” to an otherwise unpatentable claim. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191. 
Respondents assert, in both their brief to this Court 
prior to the grant of certiorari, and before the Federal 
Circuit, that claims over ‘isolated’ DNA molecules are 
suf ciently narrow in scope as to not prevent the use of 
currently available technologies to identify mutations 
such as whole genome sequencing. Yet, beyond the fact 
that its patents have prevented the development of new 
diagnostic tests such as the Ambry Genetics panel, 
this assertion has never been evaluated: “Because no 
court in the United States has ever addressed this 
issue head-on, it is impossible to entirely rule out the 
possibility that a court would interpret a claim to an 
30
isolated DNA molecule in the extremely broad sense
. . . “ Christopher M. Holman, Debunking the Myth that 
Whole-Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands of 
Gene Patents, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 240, 242 (2012). 
While Respondents have argued in these proceedings 
that the claims in issue do not prevent a number of 
general diagnostic approaches, they have not committed 
themselves to this position. Under the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisprudence on issue estoppel, the Respondents will be 
free to argue that a particular diagnostic test falling within 
one of those general diagnostic approaches infringes on its 
claims. SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Products Inc., 415 F.3d 
1278 at 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Until a court has interpreted 
the Respondents’ claims, one cannot be certain of their 
scope. 
In addition, the Respondents’ argument is not 
relevant. Simply because a post-solution activity, here 
isolation, restricts some, but not all, uses of human genes 
does not render it any more eligible for patent protection. 
As this Court warned in Diehr, the principle prohibiting 
patents on laws of nature, abstract ideas and phenomena 
of nature “cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit 
the use . . . to a particular technological environment.” 
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191. The question is not, therefore, 
which activities the Respondents say do not fall within 
the scope of their claims, but whether the Respondents 
have invented something that has a ‘markedly-different’ 
function from that which occurs in nature.
Where the patent applicant identifies a function 
in addition to that of information storage and transfer 
for an isolated but otherwise unaltered and unedited 
DNA or RNA molecule, the applicant is—provided the 
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invention also satis es §§ 102, 103, and 112 and the utility 
requirement in § 101—entitled to a claim over the use 
of that molecule for that new function. Claims in this 
form provide the inventor with appropriate recognition 
for his or her contribution without encumbering future 
innovators with claims reading over the natural function 
of those molecules. That this is a rational and balanced 
solution is illustrated by the fact that both Germany and 
France, two important competitors in the world of health 
innovation, have arrived at this same position. Section 
1a(4) of Germany’s Patentgesetz (Patent Law), 1981 BGBI 
as amended, requires that claims reading over molecules 
identical to a whole or part of a human gene must be 
restricted to the speci c utility (industrial application) 
identi ed by the inventor. Similarly, Article L611-18 of 
France’s Code de propriété intellectuelle (Intellectual 
Property Code) limits a claim reading over a component of 
the human body, including the entire or partial sequence 
of a human gene, to the utility speci ed by the inventor. 
Claims at Issue
Claim 1 of the ’282 patent is illustrative of the 
composition of matter claims in this case. It claims: “An 
isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said 
polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in 
SEQ ID NO:2.” SEQ ID NO:2 is the naturally occurring 
sequence of the protein encoded by the BRCA1 gene. 
To interpret this claim, recourse must be made to the 
speci cation, which de nes the term DNA and describes 
the functions attached to DNA. In re Suitco Surface, 
Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Rather, claims 
should always be read in light of the speci cation and 
teachings in the underlying patent”).
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The speci cation demonstrates that the use of the 
term ‘DNA’ as used in Claim 1 refers to unaltered genomic 
DNA, cDNA and altered forms of both. ’282 Patent, col. 
19, ll. 51-56. (“The polynucleotide compositions of this 
invention include RNA, cDNA, genomic DNA, synthetic 
forms, and mixed polymers, both sense and antisense 
strands, and may be chemically or biochemically modi ed 
or may contain non-natural or derivatized nucleotide 
bases, as will be readily appreciated by those skilled in 
the art.”) Claim 1 restricts the set of DNA to those that 
have been ‘isolated’. ‘Isolate’ and its cognates are used in 
many different senses in the patent speci cation but the 
explicit de nition provided is as follows: “An ‘isolated’ or 
‘substantially pure’ nucleic acid (e.g., an RNA, DNA or a 
mixed polymer) is one which is substantially separated 
from other cellular components which naturally accompany 
a native human sequence or protein, e.g., ribosomes, 
polymerases, many other human genome sequences and 
proteins.” ’282 Patent, col. 19, ll. 8-13. Thus, the inventors 
made clear that Claim 1 of the ’282 patent includes, among 
other forms of DNA, isolated but otherwise unaltered 
gDNA. As noted earlier, the speci cations provide no 
function for this gDNA other than its natural function of 
storing and transmitting information.
On the other hand, the speci cation does attribute 
functions beyond information storage to other molecules 
(i.e., other than the full gDNA molecule) falling within the 
broad scope of Claim 1 of the ’282 patent. For example, 
the speci cation states that isolated cDNA coding for the 
SEQ ID NO.2 may be used in gene therapy (the genomic 
DNA being well known at the time to be too large for 
insertion within a vector. See generally, JOSEPH SAMBROOK 
& DAVID W. RUSSELL, LABORATORY CLONING; A LABORATORY 
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MANUAL (3d ed. 2001)). One function attributed to small 
portions of isolated DNA is their use as probes or primers 
for diagnostic or other purposes. These are non-trivial 
functions and their protection, through the grant of a 
patent, would facilitate rather than lessen innovation. 
Thus, if considered alone, these molecules could have 
been claimed for their use in relation to their additional 
function (beyond information storage and transmission).
The respondents did not, however, separate out their 
claims, preferring the broader scope of Claim 1 of the ’282 
patent as drafted. If they had adopted a more conservative 
patent strategy, they could have saved a substantial and 
important component of Claim 1 of the ’282 patent and 
other impugned claims. In particular, the respondents 
could have adopted a less broad de nition of DNA that 
excluded, in this case, unaltered gDNA, which speci es 
the protein de ned by SEQ ID NO:2 and could have 
formulated their claims as a method of use of DNA for 
any of the non-natural functions. Potentially valuable sub-
sequences of gDNA, particularly those found in the non-
coding intron regions, could have given rise to valid claims 
under a number of circumstances. As an example, if a 
piece of DNA is found to bind competitively to an enhancer 
or promoter region in one of these introns, it could have 
the workings of a therapeutic molecule rather than of a 
storage medium for information and would be patentable 
for this function. Additionally, therapeutic molecules that 
target the intron sequences (e.g., to promote or inhibit 
gene expression) would constitute patentable subject 
matter as they have additional biochemical function. The 
respondents could (and did, in unchallenged claims) claim 
probe molecules that bind to speci c sequences of interest, 
or primers to direct DNA synthesis.
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Other claims of the impugned composition of matter 
claims, such as Claims 5 and 6 of the ’282 patent, appear on 
their surface to be less broad, but in reality cover virtually 
any human gene. In particular, these claims include 
any molecule containing at least any given 15 base pair 
sequence occurring within any DNA sequence that would 
produce the BRCA1 protein in SEQ ID 2. Claim 5 speci es 
over 1.6 million 15 base pair sequences, and an inde nite 
(thus in nite) number of DNA molecules that contain 
those sequences. Thomas B. Kepler, Colin Crossman and 
Robert Cook-Deegan, Metastasizing Patent Claims on 
BRCA1, 95 GENOMICS 312, 312 (2010). Searches of DNA 
sequences available before the patent was issued show 
that chromosome 1 alone had 340,000 sequences that  t 
this description, and the average gene would include 14 
sequences conforming to the claim—including several 
genes already in the public domain before the patent 
application was  led. Ibid at 313. Subsequent analysis by 
the same authors indicates that long DNA sequences of 
well over 100 base pairs—which would be unique if DNA 
sequences were truly random—are found repeatedly 
in the human genome. Remarks to the United States 
Patent Of ce, Observations from Studies of Patenting 
and Licensing Practices that Affect DNA-Based Clinical 
Testing, app. b. (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.genome.duke.
edu/centers/cpg/sec-27study/documents/Cook-Deegan
CpGstmtforUSPTOroundtable10Jan2013presentation
draft-1.docx; permission to cite obtained. The effect of 
the outcome of these studies is that anybody conducting 
a diagnostic test—whether in the course of discovery 
science or the study of another disease—on virtually any 
human gene would almost certainly produce isolated DNA 
molecules meeting the description of Claims 5 and 6, and 
thus infringe the ’282 patent.
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A reading of some of the non-impugned claims in the 
’282 patent reveal that they, in contrast with the claims 
examined above, constitute patentable subject matter. 
These would include Claims 8 to 13, all of which involve 
the use of the polynucleotide as a biochemical agent in 
addition to or instead of as an information storage and 
transmission medium. Whether these claims will survive 
a utility, novelty, non-obviousness, written description or 
enablement analysis is a separate question that does not 
arise in this case.
CONCLUSION
Following this Court’s jurisprudence, human genes 
are patentable when claims are directed to a function that 
is markedly different from the genes’ natural functions 
of genetic information storage and transmission. Hence, 
where the claim reads over a molecule corresponding to 
a naturally occurring human gene sequence, the claim 
must be restricted to the use of that molecule for that 
additional function. Where the claim reads over molecules 
corresponding to an altered version of the human gene 
sequence, unless the alteration is insigni cant (e.g., if one 
base pair is substituted for another without changing the 
coding for, in the appropriate coding frame, the amino 
acid), then that molecule may be eligible as a composition-
of-matter claim.
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